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THE CLINICIAN AS ETHICAL ROLE




An appellate litigation clinic offers law students a unique
opportunity to experience the actual process that creates much
of the law school's traditional curriculum. The clinical experi-
ence, unlike traditional courses or simulation-based classes,
forces students to address the same kinds of problems that
practitioners face, the exception being the problems of setting
and collecting fees. The student in an appellate clinic con-
fronts the very difficulties absent from the usual moot court
experience that is often advertised as an opportunity for stu-
dents to learn about litigation through brief writing and oral
argument. But the real-world experience is one of deficient
trial records,' unpreserved error,2 and existing caselaw that
* Judge George Howard, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, William H. Bow-
en School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. I would like to thank
my able colleagues, Professors Lindsey P. Gustafson and Jessie W. Burchfield of
the UALR faculty who provided valuable editorial assistance in the writing of this
article, Lindsey for her insights into structure and transition and Jessie for her
technical assistance in reviewing the manuscript.
' In Duplantis v. State, 644 So. 2d 1235 (Miss. 1994), the court declined to
review the merits of the issue raised on appeal where the record was insufficient
to demonstrate factual support for the appellant's claim that he had been denied
a required disclosure of a witness's statement or the transcript of the preliminary
hearing. "Duplantis's failure to present a proper record to this Court prevents re-
view of this issue." Id. at 1250.
2 Under Mississippi law, failure to properly preserve a challenge to sufficien-
cy of the evidence to support a conviction waives appellate review of this issue.
Holland v. State, 656 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (Miss. 1995). In Holland, the state su-
preme court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but
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is not deliberately equally balanced to ensure that both sides
in the appeal have a fair and equitable chance in argument.
The clinical education experience also achieves a broader
goal than the training of individual students. It brings the
world of practice into the law school. In this sense, the juris-
diction and its courts become active partners with the law
school in the educational experience, and the law school en-
gages the court system in the discharge of the representation
function.3 The criminal appellate clinic functions much like an
appellate defender's office, although on an admittedly much
smaller scale. Not only do student attorneys serve the impor-
tant role of providing representation for the clinic clients, but
the clinic itself may make valuable contributions to the devel-
opment of the law of the jurisdiction. Because the clinic will
handle a number of cases under the supervision of an experi-
enced appellate lawyer, it offers the potential to identify sig-
nificant issues that may lead to development of the law. The
clinic can also provide a reference point for trial lawyers
throughout the jurisdiction who are concerned about issues
and preservation of errors arising during the course of pre-
trial and trial litigation.
For all of these reasons, the professionalism of the clinic
director and supervising attorneys remains of paramount
importance in the educational experience afforded clinical
students, in the performance of the clinic in representing clin-
ic clients in the appellate courts, and in the representation of
the law school before those courts. The experience demands
that clinicians recognize the unique position of role model
created by the student/teacher relationship in the context of
the clinic experience and strive to maintain high standards of
ethical behavior and effective performance in directing the
appellate litigation clinic.
that the claim was barred due to counsel's failure to preserve error. Id.
"[A] State may also allow properly supervised law students to represent
indigent defendants." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 757 n.3 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 75
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II. THE DUAL ROLE OF THE CLINICIAN
The clinical professor and supervising attorney in any
live-client clinical setting work in dual roles: they are respon-
sible not only for ensuring the quality of the educational expe-
rience for the student, but also for guaranteeing that the insti-
tution affords its live-clients adequate representation. In reali-
ty, clinical student representation is typically more than ade-
quate, and not infrequently may exceed the quality of repre-
sentation afforded similarly situated clients by the practicing
bar. This is probably attributable to the fact that the educa-
tional experience dominates the representation, rather than
the financial aspect of representation in private cases or the
often-unrealistic caseloads handled by publicly-funded attor-
neys. The educational experience is typically guided by experi-
enced attorneys committed to clinical instruction who have
been hired based on their own academic success and reputa-
tion in practice.
Further, clinical students are highly motivated to perform
at high levels of competence, both because of the prospect of
evaluation by their instructors and the significant commit-
ment to the experience that is required for completion of the
usual clinical course. Because course caseloads are managed to
permit students adequate time to properly learn to litigate
without the pressures that often compromise performance in
private practice, students are able to focus far greater time
and energy on individual cases than will be common in their
practices later.
The competence, professionalism, and dedication of the
clinical professor are pivotal to the success of the clinical stu-
dent and the overall success of the clinic as counsel for the
client.
A. The Clinician as a Role Model for Clinical Students
Clinical faculty are often viewed as being different from
traditional faculty in terms of teaching methodologies em-
ployed, scholarship expectations, professional experience as a
factor in hiring decisions, and, regrettably, status within the
20061
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faculty as a whole. Different faculties and institutions ap-
proach clinical education differently, of course, reflecting insti-
tutional commitment ranging from sincerely held convictions
that clinical education is an essential element of the curricu-
lum to grudging accommodation of student demands that legal
education be made more "relevant" in terms of preparing stu-
dents for practice. Within a given law faculty, the perception
of the role and value of clinical faculty within the total pro-
gram will almost certainly vary among individual professors,
but the formal status of clinicians will either tend to validate
the importance of clinical education within the institution or
reflect a perspective in which clinical education is relegated to
a subordinate position within the institutional hierarchy.
What is almost certainly true about clinical faculty is that
their involvement with students in on-going matters of repre-
sentation of live-clients requires them to serve not only as
instructors, charged with explaining much of the law to their
students, but also as role models, demonstrating on a daily
basis the proper ways in which lawyers perform, discharging
their obligations to their clients and to the legal system.
1. The Unique Relationship Between Clinician
and Clinical Students
An important feature of clinical education that justifies its
labor intensive character and substantially higher per student
cost than traditional classroom instruction lies in the social-
ization of the law student through the clinical experience. In
contrast to the traditional classroom course, in which the
professor dominates the environment and interaction between
the students and professor will tend to be more formalized, if
only because it must be designed to engage non-participating
students simultaneously in the learning process, the relation-
ship between clinical student and clinical instructor must
necessarily be more intimate.
The difference is demanded by the nature of instruction:
regardless of whether a traditional class is conducted in the
format of Socratic dialogue based on appellate opinions, the
give-and-take of discussion of hypothetical problems or simula-
[Vol. 75
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tion exercises, or the less-interactive lecture format, tradition-
al courses all typically are characterized by their reliance on
non-live or hypothetical clients. In contrast, the clinical experi-
ence is dominated by the existence of a live-client involved in
an ongoing litigation or transactional experience that would
likely be duplicated in the context of a public or private law
practice if the client was not represented by law students
enrolled in a clinical law program.
2. Modeling Ethical Appellate Advocacy
A discussion of the ethics component of a criminal appel-
late clinical curriculum should focus not only on accepted
general principles for the conduct of appellate litigation, but
also on the role of the advocate in the adversarial process and
the broader questions of how the lawyer should represent the
client ethically, aggressively, and effectively. Not only does the
appellate lawyer owe primary duty to the client, but often
there are secondary considerations that may bear on the con-
duct of an appeal, including the value of appellate litigation in
promoting the rule of law and consistency in its application.4
At the outset, the clinician should consider the potential
sources of ethical commands that may bear on appellate prac-
tice and form an integral part of the instructional approach
taken in an appellate clinic that includes representation in
criminal appeals. Generally, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct incorporate recognized professional norms that gov-
" For instance, the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 21-1.2
PURPOSES OF THE CRIMINAL APPEAL, describe the functions of the direct criminal
appeal as:
(a) The purposes of the first level of appeal in criminal cases are:
(i) to protect defendants against prejudicial legal error in the pro-
ceedings leading to conviction and against verdicts unsupported by suffi-
cient evidence;
(ii) authoritatively to develop and refine the substantive and proce-
dural doctrines of criminal law; and
(iii) to foster and maintain uniform, consistent standards and prac-
tices in criminal process.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 21-1.2 (1980).
20061 745
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ern practice.' But in the context of criminal cases, a second
set of norms is also significant. The general considerations of
effectiveness recognized as a component of the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of assistance of counsel provide additional
guidance,6 particularly in light of the Supreme Court's recog-
nition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as authorita-
tive directives for the conduct of representation.7 Third, the
problem of frivolous appeals must typically be addressed by
' The three elements of the Model Rules most applicable to appellate practice
are perhaps:
1). Rule 1.1, which directs: "A lawyer shall provide competent legal repre-
sentation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2001). This rule requires counsel to represent
the client ably and professionally in very general terms.
2). Rule 3.3, which directs counsel to disclose known controlling authority to
the court and opposing counsel:
A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by oppos-
ing counsel.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2001), and;
3). Rule 3.1, which authorizes appellate counsel to ask the appellate court to
overturn or modify existing precedent when a good faith reason for doing so exists:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an exten-
sion, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant
in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could
result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to
require that every element of the case be established.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (emphasis added).
' In Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000), the Court recognized the
application of the two-prong test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to challenges
based on counsel's representation on direct appeal. The test requires a showing of
both defective performance by counsel and the reasonable probability that but for
counsel's error or errors the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285-86.
' Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) ("Counsel's conduct similarly fell
short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar
Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have referred as 'guides to deter-
mining what is reasonable.') (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 and citing Wil-
liams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)).
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the criminal lawyer' and should be part of the discussion of
ethical performance in the criminal appellate clinic. Finally,
apart from the "rules" that govern representation in criminal
appeals, the appellate lawyer routinely makes decisions that
implicate professional values, but do not necessarily suggest
ethical or unethical behavior. These include the determination
of which issues should be raised in the appellate brief,9 the
decision whether to challenge precedent that would otherwise
require the appellate court to reject claims factually supported
by the record," the decision to raise unpreserved claims of
error,11 and the decision to seek discretionary review. 2
' See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 278 n.10, affirming counsel's obligation under An-
ders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), to review the record on appeal to
determine existence of potential claims before certifying to the appellate court
that in his opinion the appeal is frivolous. Under Anders, the Court had suggest-
ed that counsel also be required to identify potentially meritorious claims in his
brief to the appellate court. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 268.
' For the author's views on the question of issue selection, see J. Thomas
Sullivan, Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: The "Ethical" Issue of Issue
Selection, 80 DENVER U. L. REV. 155 (2002).
0 Similarly, for the author's views on the problems posed by unfavorable pre-
cedent, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Ethical and Aggressive Appellate Advocacy: Con-
fronting Adverse Precedent, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (2005).
" For instance, in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993), the
Court affirmed the authority of a federal circuit court reviewing an unpreserved
claim of error to grant relief from prejudice caused by the error pursuant to Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Mississippi appellate courts retain authori-
ty to review unpreserved claims. Tate v. State, 784 So. 2d 208, 214 (9 25) (Miss.
2001). ("(1In order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, this Court retains the in-
herent power to notice error notwithstanding trial counsel's failure to preserve the
error.") (citing Johnson v. Fargo, 604 So. 2d 306, 311 (Miss. 1992)); accord John-
son v. State, 452 So. 2d 850, 853 (Miss. 1984); cf Miss. R. Evmr. 103(d)
(Mississippi Supreme Court may notice plain errors that affect substantial rights).
1 THE ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE recognize counsel's duty to con-
tinue to provide representation in the discretionary review process, whether in
representing the litigant petitioning for review or in responding to a petition for
discretionary review brought by the prosecution following a reversal of the client's
case by the intermediate court. Standard 21-3.2 Counsel on Appeal, provides, in
pertinent part:
(d) In a jurisdiction with an intermediate appellate court, counsel
for a defendant-appellant or a defendant-appellee should continue to
represent the client if the prosecution seeks review in the highest court,
unless new counsel is substituted or unless the highest court permits
counsel to withdraw. Similarly, in any jurisdiction, such appellate counsel
20061
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The extensive range of issues and sources for considering
ethical and professional behavior may themselves form a sub-
stantial core of instructional materials for teaching even the
conventional law school course in professional responsibili-
ty. 3 But in a clinical setting, in which representation in on-
going litigation is the primary means of transmission of pro-
fessional skills and values, the amount of time devoted to
formal consideration of all potential issues in a traditional
context would likely impinge on the ability to focus on repre-
sentation and the need to provide effective representation to
clinic clients. Consequently, the clinician's role is critical in
terms of affording students a role model demonstrating an
approach to representation and litigation that will provide
them with a framework upon which to address new problems
they will ultimately encounter after graduation. It is precisely
should continue to represent the client if the prosecution seeks review in
the Supreme Court of the United States.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 21-3.2 (1980). But, in Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that indi-
gent state court defendants were entitled to assistance of appointed or publicly
compensated counsel in petitioning for Supreme Court review of federal constitu-
tional claims decided adversely to the defendant by the state courts. The Court
also held that counsel is not required to file discretionary appeals even when re-
quested by the client if the issues raised are not meritorious and would potentially
subject counsel to sanctions. Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1994).
" Professors Justine Dunlap and Peter A. Joy observe:
As is true with all good teaching, one must decide upon the overall
goals for the classroom component and the goals for each class session
before planning the substantive content of the classes. In some clinical
programs, the classes are used to focus on lawyering skills, such as
client interviewing, counseling, negotiation, pretrial, and trial skills. Oth-
er clinical programs focus upon the substantive law and procedure of the
clinical course's particular subject matter, such as community develop-
ment, consumer law, criminal defense, or family law. In these latter
programs, the class sessions usually focus on aspects of the procedure
and substantive law involved in representing clinic clients. Still other
clinical programs use the classroom component for case conferencing or
case rounds focusing on the students' cases and strategies they are con-
sidering.
Justin A. Dunlap & Peter A. Joy, Reflection-in-Action: Designing New Clinical
Teacher Training by Using Lessons Learned from New Clinicians, 11 CLINICAL L.
REv. 49, 75 (2004) (hereafter Reflection-in-Action).
[Vol. 75
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because the full range of potential ethical problems that arise
in practice cannot be discussed thoroughly during the tradi-
tional component of a clinical class or anticipated in represen-
tation in the clinical experience that the clinician as role mod-
el offers the greatest insight into ethical and professional
behavior. 4
Nevertheless, the clinician should present an organized,
comprehensive approach to the doctrines touching on effective-
ness in appellate representation, and the remainder of this
article is devoted to one possibility in this respect. Other mod-
els will undoubtedly offer alternative benefits, still others may
be better suited to the particular personal experience of the
clinician or culture of the jurisdiction in which the clinic oper-
ates. But any organized approach requires a starting point
and this article offers one.
B. The Clinician's Role in Ensuring
Competent Representation
The clinician's success as a role model for clinical law
students is dependent on a number of factors, some of which
are similar to general characteristics that facilitate successful
practice. For example, the clinical instructor blessed with
charisma in the teaching setting may well be relying on a
personal trait that also translates well into performance be-
fore a jury in trial. Some clinicians may be lacking in charis-
ma, but offer a degree of interpersonal understanding and
empathy that fosters a positive learning environment, particu-
larly for students less than confident in the social skills as-
sumed to be required for success in practice.
But in a concrete sense, the clinician must always be
' "In the clinic, much of the important learning occurs in the course of law-
yering, not in the confines of the classroom. While the classroom component is
important in assisting clinical students to become effective and reflective practitio-
ners, do not overstate its importance either to your students or yourself." Id. at
77. Dunlap and Joy draw upon the work of DONALD SCHON, EDUCATING THE RE-
FLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1987), who advocates that the work of professionals must




grounded in the law and practice skills necessary for the clini-
cal experience. For the clinician directing an appellate clinic,
and particularly one specializing or emphasizing criminal
appellate representation, the clInician's behavior and practices
must necessarily reflect the best model for practice. The need
to ensure that the clinic's representation reflects competence
and professionalism dictates that the clinician address super-
vision of the student's work on the appeal in an organized and
diligent fashion, demanding that the student also approach
the case in a similarly organized and diligent fashion. Other-
wise, the representation may fail and the client's legitimate
expectations may be frustrated in the process. In order to
maximize the prospects for successful representation, the
clinician as role model should approach the clinic case relying
on the same "best practices" that would be employed in pri-
vate practice.
1. Reviewing the Record
Initially, the clinician must be familiar with the trial
record, which serves as the record on appeal, in order to prop-
erly consult with the student and ensure that the student
then properly advises the client. The advice to the client en-
compasses both the identification of issues that may be argued
in the brief and assessment of the potential for success on
appeal. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Jones
v. Barnes, noted: "There can hardly be any question about the
importance of having the appellate advocate examine the
record with a view to selecting the most promising issues for
review.""5
2. Identifying Potential Issues and Arguments
Once thoroughly familiar with the record of the proceed-
ings in the court below, the clinical instructor and student
attorney must evaluate potential issues that may be raised in
the appellate brief and the likelihood of success in order to
16 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983).
750 [Vol. 75
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properly advise the client. 6 In Jones v. Barnes, the majority
concluded that the ultimate decision concerning which issues
should be argued in the appeal is committed to the discretion
of counsel, rather than the appellant. 7 Counsel's decision not
to pursue a particular issue desired by the client does not
result in ineffective assistance.
At this point, counsel's professional judgment must ulti-
mately override a student's objection that a point should not
be raised or lacks support in the record. However, where the
student argues in favor of inclusion of a point in the record
against the clinician's judgment, the issue should certainly be
presented to the client, if close." Regardless of general pro-
nouncements that appellate counsel should reduce the number
of claims raised as a convenience to the appellate courts, adop-
16 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 21-3.2(BXi) provides, in
pertinent part:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional evalu-
ation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, when
inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect the
validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence, including any that
might require initial presentation in a postconviction proceeding. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction
or sentence.
Id.
'17 Jones, 463 U.S. at 754. The Jones majority rejected the position advanced
in the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 21-3.2. Justice Brennan
offered a strongly worded dissent, observing:
The Court subtly but unmistakably adopts a different conception of
the defense lawyer's role-he need do nothing beyond what the State, not
his client, considers most important. In many ways, having a lawyer
becomes one of the many indignities visited upon someone who has the
ill fortune to run afoul of the criminal justice system. I cannot accept
the notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a person receives
merely for being accused of a crime. Clients, if they wish, are capable of
making informed judgments about which issues to appeal, and when
they exercise that prerogative their choices should be respected unless
they would require lawyers to violate their consciences, the law, or their
duties to the court.
Id. at 755, 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" In Smith, 528 U.S. at 278 n.10, the Court observed: "[Ain indigent does, in
all cases, have the right to have an attorney, zealous for the indigent's interests,
evaluate his case and attempt to discern nonfrivolous arguments."
20061
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
tion of this approach in the clinical setting may serve to un-
dermine both the client's legitimate expectations for aggres-
sive representation"9 and the student's interest in litigating
aggressively.
The clinician's expertise is particularly important in en-
suring not only that potential issues be properly identified and
evaluated, but that alternative theories supporting the argu-
ment be considered. This is particularly important in two
respects. First, the argument should be framed to provide
alternative grounds for relief predicated on both federal and
state constitutional authority supporting theories for relief
when appropriate. 0 For example, Mississippi courts have
consistently upheld the right of the criminal defendant to ad-
dress the jury personally in closing argument, even when
represented by counsel." This right is specifically grounded
in the language of the state constitution which provides "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be
heard by himself or counsel, or both."22 A comparable express
right is not found in the Fifth or Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and a state court appellant relying
on the federal constitution as support for a claim based on
See Commentary to ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 21-
3.2. COUNSEL ON APPEAL:
Counsel has the professional duty to give to the client fully and forceful-
ly an opinion concerning the case and its probable outcome. Counsel's
role, however, is to advise. The decision is made by the client. 'A de-
fense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client ful-
ly . .. as to the prospects of success on appeal, but it is for the client
to decide . ..whether an appeal should be taken.'
Id.
20 Mississippi, for instance, recognizes reliance on state constitutional
protections as an alternative basis for relief. See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So.
2d 713, 721-22 (Miss. 1984) (recognizing that Mississippi constitution includes
same protections as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for state court defendants
demonstrating "an adequate and equal basis" for relief on state constitutional
grounds); Orick v. State, 105 So. 465, 466 (Miss. 1925) (relying on United States
Supreme Court reasoning in holding that Mississippi constitution afforded similar
protections to state court defendants).
2 See, e.g., Armstead v. State, 716 So. 2d 576, 580 (Miss. 1998).
22 MISS. CONST. art. 3 § 26.
[Vol. 75
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denial of the right would likely lose either in the state courts
or on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.23
Second, the brief presented to state appellate courts
should include federalized claims when possible to permit the
client to present federal constitutional arguments to the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court by petition for writ of certiorari or
through the federal habeas corpus process once the litigant
has exhausted the state court process. 24 Even though a spe-
cific federal constitutional provision may not be advanced by
trial counsel as the basis for objection, appellate counsel
should cite supporting federal constitutional grounds because
an appellate court's ruling on the merits of the federal consti-
tutional claim will preserve the claim for later review in the
federal system.
For instance, in Cannaday v. State,5 the state supreme
court noted that the precise constitutional claim had not been
made by trial counsel in his repeated objections to improper
argument alluding to the defendant's statement taken in vio-
lation of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to remain
silent and to assistance of counsel.26 Nevertheless, the court
" The Supreme Court could exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to consider a
state court's reliance of Federal Constitutional protections in ruling for the defen-
dant in such a situation, eventually reversing the state court if it concluded that
the Federal Constitution does not protect an accused's right to address the jury
personally. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (Court exercises
its right to review state court decisions purportedly relying on Federal Constitu-
tional provisions to ensure uniform construction of federal law, presuming that
state courts rely on Federal Constitution unless clearly articulating an adequate
and independent ground for decision under state law).
24 28 U.S.C. § 2254 permits state court defendants to seek relief in federal
court from violations of rights protected by federal law occurring in their state
criminal trials. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
25 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984).
26 Cannaday, 455 So. 2d at 721-22. The court noted the State's argument that
trial counsel had failed to preserve error:
The error assigned on appeal is that this statement was elicited from
Ms. Cannaday in violation of her U.S. constitutional rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The state argues that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment right objection was not made at trial, and therefore, it is
procedurally barred and not before this Court.
Id. at 721.
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
concluded that the objections were sufficient to alert the trial
court, observing: "[Tihis Court is compelled to note that objec-
tion was repeatedly made by defense counsel although not
based on the specific ground of the right to counsel."27 The
court then proceeded to consider the claim on the merits of
both federal and state constitutional guarantees, concluding:
Although counsel was not as articulate in his first objection of
"prejudicial" or "inflammatory" as he might have been, the
objection was made, and the repeated objections cannot be
ignored where fundamental constitutional rights are involved.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12
L.Ed. 246 (1964). The gravity of this statement is evidenced
by the fact that on the motion for a new trial, Judge Griffin
stated: "I think that part about the head is probably what
brought the death sentence." In view of defense counsel's
objection, we address this issue on its merits in this capital
murder case.28
The Cannaday court then agreed with appellate counsel's theo-
ry of the violation, finding, however, that the error was harm-
less as to the defendant's conviction for capital murder, but
also that the prejudice resulting from the inflammatory nature
of her statement required reversal of the death sentence im-
posed.29
3. Developing a Theme to Support the Prejudice Argument
Students, due to their inexperience in litigation, may have
difficulty in developing a theory of the case essential to demon-
strating the requisite level of prejudice necessary to obtain a
reversal on an erroneous ruling in the trial court. This is, in
fact, a common problem for even experienced criminal practitio-
ners when proceeding at trial against either overwhelming
evidence or when relying on a defensive theory at trial to the
exclusion of alternative explanations that could have been
27 Id.
20 Id.
2 Id. at 724.
[Vol. 75
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advanced. On appeal, counsel must typically be able to demon-
strate some degree of prejudice in order to obtain reversal on
all claims other than structural error, for which prejudice is
presumed. Even the most favorable standard of review for
criminal defendants, the harmless error test of Chapman v.
California" requiring reversal for constitutional error unless
the error is found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
requires some showing of probable prejudice for constitutional
trial errors. 1 Non-constitutional error is typically governed by
a standard requiring the appellant to demonstrate some degree
of prejudice in order to secure reversal.32
An example of the use of the trial record to demonstrate
probable prejudice is presented in Hickson v. State." The de-
fendant, charged with sexual battery, prospectively challenged
admission of his prior conviction for a similar offense by motion
in limine.34 The state supreme court granted certiorari to re-
view the court of appeals' holding that the claimed error had
not been preserved." The trial court had noted the probable
admissibility of the prior conviction, stressing on the record
that the prosecution might want to use it for purposes of im-
peachment." The supreme court concluded that the trial court
had failed to conduct the necessary probative value/prejudice
balancing test prior to ruling essentially that the prior convic-
'o 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. See supra note 20 for a discussion of constitu-
tional trial error based on the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991), overruling Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), where
the Court held that prejudice requiring reversal of the conviction would be pre-
sumed from the admission of a coerced confession against the accused at trial. In
Fulminante, the Court held that claims of constitutional error committed during
the course of trial that could be evaluated in terms of prejudice by looking at the
entire trial record would be governed by Chapman, not requiring reversal if the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the whole record.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308-09.
3' See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
3 697 So. 2d 391 (Miss. 1997).
' Hickson, 697 So. 2d at 393.
35 id.
31 Id. at 396.
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tion would be admissible for impeachment. 7 Hickson argued
that the prospect of its admission chilled his exercise of his
right to testify in his own defense.'
The supreme court explained that the trial court's failure
to conduct the proper test in determining admissibility of
Hickson's prior conviction had, in fact, abused its discretion:
"The judge's ruling that evidence of the prior conviction could
be admitted had a chilling effect on Hickson's testifying, and he
did not testify."39 The court then explained why the error re-
quired reversal, rejecting the intermediate court's claim that
Hickson had failed to support his claim with an offer of proof.
It concluded:
Hickson entered a plea of not guilty to the offense. He pre-
sented three alibi witnesses that he was in Memphis, Ten-
nessee, at the time of the alleged acts. As counsel points out,
common sense and logic tell you that Hickson's testimony
would mirror that of his alibi witnesses.
Hickson's testimony was obviously critical to his defense,
both as to his alibi defense and because he was the only wit-
ness that could address issues surrounding the purported fin-
gerprint from a public video store introduced by the State. An
on the record proffer would not have added one iota to the
record already before the Court. Pet. for Cert. at 8-9.
Counsel would appear to be correct, and this factor dis-
tinguishes this case from Saucier [562 So. 2d 1238 (Miss.
1990)]. Additionally, pursuant to the many cases cited above,
" Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 397. Mississippi law requires the trial court's weighing of the pro-
bative value and potential prejudice in admission of evidence otherwise subject to
exclusion appear on the record:
Procedurally, the balancing requirements of [Evidence Rule] 609(aXl)
require a court to make an on-the-record finding of admissibility. John-
son v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 587 (Miss. 1988); Peterson, 518 So. 2d
[632,] 638. Our case law requires the trial judge to make an on-the-re-
cord ruling on admissibility prior to admission of evidence from the wit-
ness of a prior conviction. Mclnnis, 527 So. 2d [84,] 87 [Miss. 1988];
Peterson, 518 So. 2d at 636.
3 Id.
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because the judge did not make an on the record analysis of
the Peterson factors, or any analysis at all concerning his
denial of Hickson's motion in limine, this error requires that
the case be reversed and remanded for a new trial.4 °
The court's explanation demonstrates the thrust of the
prejudice argument, that the trial court's ruling effectively
deprived the appellant of the critical evidence that might have
convinced the jury of his lack of culpability or raised a reason-
able doubt.41 Because his was the only testimony that could
not only support his alibi, but explain the fingerprint evidence,
the trial court's abuse of discretion in preemptively indicating
its position that his prior conviction would be admissible to im-
peach his trial testimony effectively deprived him of evidence
critical to his defense.42
In arguing the case for reversal, a showing of actual or
probable prejudice may be required, but will always be valu-
able if it is grounded in common sense and logic and supported
by the record evidence. The clinician's experience in developing
a theory of the case that supports a claim of prejudice attribut-
able to trial court error will prove essential in many instances.
The clinical student learns this part of the appellate craft by
having to address prejudice in analyzing the claims urged in
the appellate brief and developing the argument supporting the
claims.
4. Reviewing the Applicable Law
The clinical instructor or supervising attorney plays an
additional role of extreme importance in ensuring effective
representation for clinic clients. While clinic students may be
adept at legal research and finding the applicable law govern-
ing the outcome of a case, the experience of the clinician may
be particularly important when the law is unsettled, even






An example arises in the context of the proper application of
the ex post facto prohibition enumerated in the Constitution.43
The constitutional prohibition is designed to prevent unfair
retroactive application of law in criminal cases. In Calder v.
Bull," the Court recognized four categories of ex post facto
violations, including, briefly: new laws criminalizing conduct
not criminal at the time of its commission; changes in law that
retroactively increase punishment over that available on the
date of the offense; changes in law denying the defendant a de-
fense available on the date of the offense; and changes in law
reducing the prosecution's burden of proof from that required to
prove the offense on the date of its commission.45
However, in the 1925 case of Beazell v. Ohio," the Court's
opinion did not include any reference to the fourth category of
ex post facto violation. The three remaining categories were
subsequently identified as constituting the parameters of the
protection in Collins v. Youngblood.47 In neither case was the
fourth category expressly overruled. Nevertheless, any practi-
tioner or clinical student lawyer might have concluded that
Collins was controlling with respect to the parameters of the
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Of course, the experienced clinician will also
be aware of the possibility that comparable state constitutional provisions may
also be available to afford relief. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 659 So. 2d 547, 551
(Miss. 1994) (deciding case based on Mississippi constitutional ex post facto pro-
hibition in Art. III, § 16 of state constitution).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
" Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Call.) at 390-91.
46 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925).
4' 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). The Collins majority discussed the fourth category
in addressing the holding in Calder v. Bull, id. at 42, but omitted it from its
conclusion:
The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not
punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent
when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense
available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Its
application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post
Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10.
Id. at 52.
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protection afforded by the Ex Post Facto Clause.48
Some state rules relating to the quality of evidence neces-
sary for conviction suggest the significance of the fourth catego-
ry. For instance, in many jurisdictions, the testimony of an
accomplice is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated
by independent evidence linking the accused to commission of
the crime."' A second rule of evidentiary sufficiency applicable
in Mississippi prosecutions involves the degree of proof re-
quired to sustain a conviction based entirely on circumstantial
evidence. In such cases, a minority of jurisdictions require the
State to offer evidence sufficient to not only establish all ele-
ments of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but also estab-
lish guilt "to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other
than that of guilt." ° In Stringfellow v. State, the Mississippi
Supreme Court noted that this rule had been discarded in
other jurisdictions, while rejecting the State's appeal that the
court similarly abandon its application in Mississippi prosecu-
tions."1
The ex post facto question is presented when a jurisdiction
does abandon a rule of evidentiary sufficiency, applying a more
lenient rule retroactively to cases pending prior to the change
in law. This was precisely the issue before the United States
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
49 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-111(eXl)(A) (2005) (requiring corroboration of
accomplice testimony to support conviction for felony or juvenile offense; corrob-
oration must tend to connect defendant to offense and not simply show that the
offense was committed or the circumstances under which it was committed); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2000) (requiring accomplice testimony
corroboration). Under Mississippi law, the testimony of an accomplice is viewed
with suspicion, but may be adequate to support conviction even if uncorroborated
unless it is unreasonable, improbable, self-contradictory, of impeached. Jones v.
State, 368 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Miss. 1979). However, a cautionary instruction
regarding the reliability of accomplice testimony is required if the prosecution
relies on uncorroborated accomplice testimony inculpating the defendant. Strahan
v. State, 729 So. 2d 800, 805 (Miss. 1998); accord Mangum v. State, 762 So. 2d
337, 342 (Miss. 2000) (affirming conviction where jury instructed on reliability of
accomplice testimony by viewing testimony "with great suspicion and distrust"
because on slight corroboration required to sustain conviction).




Supreme Court in Murphy v. Kentucky,52 in which the defen-
dants were convicted on uncorroborated accomplice testimony
although at the time of the offense state law required corrobo-
ration of this type of evidence in order to sustain conviction.53
In dissenting from the denial of certiorari on the claimed ex
post facto violation, Justice White noted a split in jurisdictions
previously reaching this issue in arguing, consistent with his
traditional view, that the Court should resolve the split.54
The unresolved question presented for practitioners in light
of Collins is whether a change in state law relating to abolition
of accomplice corroboration or heightened scrutiny of circum-
stantial evidence implicates ex post facto prohibitions. It is not
unlikely that many lawyers would have concluded that relief
would not be forthcoming on such claims following Collins. But
a thoughtful criminal appellate lawyer, the type of lawyer ide-
ally supervising criminal appellate clinical students, would
have been sufficiently familiar with Calder, Beazell and Collins
to realize that the Court had never formally rejected the fourth
category of ex post facto protections.
In fact, in the Court's 2000 decision in Carmell v. Texas,55
the fourth category was explicitly discussed by both the majori-
ty 6 and dissent 7 in the review of a change in Texas statuto-
52 465 U.S. 1072 (1984) (White, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Powell, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari).
'3 Murphy, 465 U.S. at 1072-73.
Justice White observed in concluding his opinion respecting the denial of
certiorari:
Because of the evident confusion among lower courts concerning the
application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to changes in rules of evidence
and procedure-and because some 15 other states have accomplice-corrobo-
ration requirements that they may choose to abolish, see App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 83-5352, p. 15-we disregard our duty when certiorari is
denied. Respectfully, I dissent.
Id. at 1073. On Justice White's attitude toward the Court's duty to resolve splits
in constitutional interpretation, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Justice White's Principled
Passion for Consistency, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 79 (2002).
6' 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 521-34.
5 Id. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's dissent character-
ized the change in law as one involving only a matter of evidentiary admissibility
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ry law permitting conviction for a sexual assault offense with-
out the former requirement of "outcry" on the part of the com-
plainant.58 The majority held that the legislative abolition of
the outcry requirement constituted an ex post facto application
of law where the defendant was tried for an offense allegedly
committed before the date of the legislative change in the law,
but after the effective date of repeal of the outcry provision.
Because there was no "outcry" corroboration of the
complainant's testimony, Carmell successfully argued that his
conviction rested on insufficient evidence.
Finally, one other consideration would be particularly sig-
nificant in determining whether a departure from traditional
rules of evidentiary sufficiency violates the protection afforded
by the Ex Post Facto Clause. That is, whether any change in
the law is the result of legislative, rather than judicial action.
In Rogers v. Tennessee,59 a 5-4 majority of the Court held that
judicial abrogation of the common law "year and a day rule"
prohibiting a homicide prosecution where death did not occur
within a year and a day following the commission of the act
causing death6" did not implicate ex post facto principles be-
cause the Clause itself is restricted to legislative action.61 The
majority further rejected the argument that retroactive applica-
tion of the state court's ruling violated due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.62 Instead, the majority distinguished
legislative action from judicial retroactivity in reaching its
conclusion that the constitutional limitations on the former do
not necessarily apply to the latter.63
that traditionally had been held not to implicate ex post facto protections in Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380,
380-82, 386-88 (1898). Id. at 570-71.
'a TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art 38.07 (Vernon 2000) (amended in 1993).
" 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 453.
61 Id. at 455. The majority noted that although the petition presented his
claims in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, he predicated
much of his argument on the protections afforded by the ex post facto prohibition.
Id.
Id "We have observed, however, that limitations on ex post facto judicial
decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process." Id. at 456.
63 Id. at 460-62. Justice Scalia, in dissent, disputed the majority's conclusion
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Thus, not only would a change in either the accomplice
witness or circumstantial evidence rules raise the question of
constitutional retroactive application again revisiting the close
decisions in Carmell and Collins, but also the distinction split-
ting the Court in Rogers. Evaluation of a retroactivity claim
implicating these difficult issues requires that the clinician
have not only a broad understanding of criminal law in order to
advise students within the clinical setting, but also sufficient
depth to articulate proper application of precedent in evaluat-
ing likely success of issues that might be urged on appeal. With
regard to the example of changes in standards of proof, the
narrow majorities in controlling United States Supreme Court
decisions indicate the potential significance of these issues not
only in the direct appeal from conviction, but for further review
in state courts of last resort or in the Supreme Court.
5. Reserving Rebuttal Argument to Cure Defects
Oral argument remains a significant step in the appellate
process in many appeals.' Of particular concern to counsel is
on this point. Id. at 467, 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justices, Stevens
and Thomas and by Breyer in part). Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent, as
well. Id. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Oral argument is no longer considered a matter of right in many jurisdic-
tions. For example, the Mississippi rule governing oral argument provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) When Allowed. Oral argument will be had in all death penalty cases.
In all other cases, oral argument will be allowed unless the court, or the
panel to which the case is assigned, unanimously agrees that:
(1) the appeal is frivolous; or
(2) the dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively
decided; or
(3) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by
oral argument.
Miss. R. APP. P. 34(a).
The rules also require that parties specifically request oral argument or notify
the court of their intention to waive argument. MIss. R. APP. P. 34(b). The rule re-
quires the party requesting oral argument to explain in their brief (Appellee's prin-
cipal brief or Appellant's reply brief) or by separate letter why oral argument will
"be helpful to the court." Id. The court also retains discretion to order oral argu-
ment even if not requested by either of the parties. Id.
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that oral argument is often most important because
questioning from the bench may lead to admissions that will
result in the appeal being lost, rather than the reverse-that
the oral argument will provide an opportunity to win the ap-
peal. For instance, the Supreme Court expressly noted in
Dretke v. Haley:65
Petitioner here conceded at oral argument that respondent
has a viable and "significant" ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18 ("[W~e agree at this point there is a
very significant argument of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel"); see also id., at 7 (agreeing "not [to] raise any procedural
impediment" to consideration of the merits of respondent's
ineffective assistance claim on remand).
66
Here, counsel's admission was deemed sufficiently significant to
be noted in the Court's opinion. In the context of clinical repre-
sentation, the concern is that the student attorney is unlikely
to be prepared to respond to a question from the bench that
might evoke a dispositive concession or an admission warrant-
ed neither by the factual record or controlling caselaw.
Experienced attorneys may use oral argument to clarify
the client's position on appeal or resolve a troubling dispute
over the contents of the record. Oral argument affords the only
opportunity in the typical appeal to address the appellate court
in circumstances permitting counsel to determine whether a
particular point is understood by the judges themselves.
The clinician should consider reserving the option of ad-
dressing the court during oral argument to provide backup to
the far less experienced student advocate. This may involve
reserving rebuttal or requesting that the panel permit counsel
to split the argument.67 For clinicians, splitting oral argu-
541 U.S. 386 (2004).
6 Dretke, 541 U.S. at 394 (alteration in original).
67 Of course, clinical representation in the direct appeal process almost neces-
sarily dictates that the caseload will primarily include appeals in which the clinic
represents appellants, with the occasional prosecution appeal a possibility. There-
fore the clinic will likely have the opportunity to open the argument and close
with rebuttal. See, e.g., MISS. R. APP. P. 34(e).
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ment-when permitted by the court-provides an opportunity
to ensure that the inexperience of the student will not result in
the case being compromised. The clinic may well lose the case,
but active participation of the clinician during oral argument
may prevent a loss that results from an unfortunate answer
offered in response to an unanticipated question from the
bench or the student's confusion over a critical point of law.
C. Dangers Inherent in Accepting Failure as a Legitimate
Education Tool
The role of a lawyer involved in clinical legal education is
often complicated by the competing interests of the educational
process and the goal of providing effective representation for
the clinic's clients."5 The education of the clinical law student
may be furthered in some situations by permitting the student
to complete the representation of the client without interven-
tion by the clinic director or supervising attorney, even when
the student's lack of knowledge, experience, or expertise may
result in failure.69 In maintaining a "hands-off" policy,7" the
" See Reflection-in-Action, supra note 13, at 67. In their study of clinical
teaching methods based on a survey of younger clinical faculty, Justine A. Dunlap
and Peter A. Joy discuss the demands of clinical teaching that often prove most
difficult for lawyers engaged in clinical education. They note:
[New clinicians should realize that teaching students in a clinic is dif-
ferent from supervising other lawyers or even law students in a legal
practice. The experience of supervision in practice settings and the skills
involved in such supervision may be helpful to understanding clinical
pedagogy, but clinical teaching requires an emphasis on helping students
develop their ability to learn from experience. Rather than telling a
clinic student what to do, clinical methodology calls for asking the stu-
dent what he or she thinks needs to be done and why.
Next, the clinician discusses the student's plan for accomplishing the
work, reviews and critiques the student's work when it is complete, and
then discusses what the student believes to be the next steps. Many new
clinicians were surprised by the demands of clinical teaching and the
fact that the experience of supervising law clerks or other lawyers does
not transfer wholesale to clinical teaching.
Id. They also note the particular response of one clinician surveyed who had prac-
ticed before undertaking clinical teaching: "This is nothing like handling your own
cases and having student interns." Id. at 67 n.60.
69 See id. at 89 n.148. A number of experienced clinical teachers have pre-
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clinician makes a calculated decision that the adverse conse-
quences can be so pedagogically valuable in exposing students
to the reality of failure as an experience that must be ad-
dressed in real-world practice that compromising the client's
interests are justified.7'
This approach seems particularly naive in the context of
appellate representation for a number of important reasons.
Perhaps most significant is the fact that accepting avoidable
failure may influence the student's perception of the clinician
as mentor and role model, leading to acceptance of failure in
litigation as an acceptable norm.72 Of course, virtually all trial
and appellate lawyers suffer failure as a consequence of taking
cases; undoubtedly, few enter into representation without some
consideration of the potential consequences of failure. In fact,
the failure option is often the most important consideration for
viously discussed the role of ethical conduct in clinical representation. See general-
ly Alexis Anderson, Arlene Kanter & Cindy Slane, Ethics in Externships: Confi-
dentiality, Conflicts, and Competence Issues in the Field and in the Classroom, 10
CLINICAL L. REV. 473 (2004); Naomi R. Cahn, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics:
Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993); George Critchlow, Professional Re-
sponsibility, Student Practice, and the Clinical Teacher's Duty to Intervene, 26
GONZ. L. REV. 415 (1991); Peter A. Joy, The Ethics of Law School Clinic Students
as Student Lawyers, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 815 (2004); Peter A. Joy, The Law School
Clinic as a Model Ethical Law Office, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 35 (2003); Peter
A. Joy & Robert E. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues in Law
Clinic Practice, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 493 (2002); James E. Moliterno, In-House
Live-Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2377
(1999).
71 See Reflection-in-Action, supra note 13, at 62. Respondents in the
Dtnlap!Joy survey noted that the seventh most difficult aspect of clinical teaching
is "[k]nowing how much or when to intervene." Id. Perhaps somewhat telling,
earlier data from 2001 indicated that clinical teachers considered the ninth most
difficult aspect of clinical teaching being "[sitaying out of the way." Id. at 63.
71 Id. at 87-91. Clinicians discuss the issue of intervention by the supervising
attorney in terms of the directive and non-directive approaches. Id. at 84-90. The
latter approach emphasizes the value of learning through failure, although clini-
cians deny that non-intervention can be justified if it will result in irreparable
injury to the client's interests. Id. at 88-89.
72 Moliterno, supra note 69, at 2387-89. Professor Moliterno argues that accep-
tance of failure sends the message that the interests of the lawyer, reflected in
the clinician's interest in the educational goals of the clinic rather than in the




lawyer and client in discussing alternative courses of action. In
some instances, counsel and client will proceed in an action
virtually certain that the outcome will be unsuccessful, but the
process of raising and litigating an issue or defense is impor-
tant enough for a day in court.
For clinical law education purposes, discussion of potential
outcomes and possible failures should be included in the discus-
sions concerning alternatives available to the client. But this is
far different from accepting failure as a consequence of trial
error-including student lawyer error-that can be avoided by
intervention by a seasoned supervising attorney.73 In fact, cli-
nicians should consider the criminal defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance on appeal as the paramount con-
cern for clinical representation. The right of effective counsel
cannot be ethically compromised for educational purposes,
regardless of the otherwise appealing logic that learning is
often advanced by the experience of failure.74
III. CONCLUSION
The criminal appellate litigation clinic offers the law school
and law students a unique educational opportunity. The insti-
tution is able to afford criminal appellate clinic students an
unparalleled instructional experience in the way actual cases
are litigated. The learning experience is not exclusively con-
fined to the processes by which counsel actually pursues the
appeal on behalf of the client-reviewing the record, formulat-
ing a theme or combination of themes for the brief, researching
the law, drafting the legal argument-but also includes an
intensive review of the criminal trial process. For students, the
appellate litigation clinic is an exercise in which substantive
concepts, procedural rules, trial tactics, and evidentiary consid-
erations are integrated in a single case. The clinical student,
" See J. Thomas Sullivan, Teaching Appellate Advocacy in an Appellate Clini-
cal Law Program, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 1277, 1304-06 (1992) (advocating duty
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like the practitioner, deals with law in the context of the litiga-
tion process, rather than in the abstract discussion that often
characterizes traditional classroom instruction.
For the institution, the criminal appellate clinic also serves
additional important purposes. The institution, through the
clinic, becomes actively involved in the organic process of devel-
opment of the law through litigation in the jurisdiction's appel-
late courts. Through the clinician and student representation,
the institution also makes valuable contributions to profession-
al and public service in providing representation to clients,
whose cases require skilled representation, and to the broader
interests of improving the quality of appellate practice in the
jurisdiction.
